ABSTRACT False data injection (FDI) attacks, as a new class of cyberattacks, bring a severe threat to the security and reliable operation of the smart grid by damaging the state estimation of the power system. To address this issue, an extreme learning machine (ELM)-based one-class-one-network (OCON) framework is proposed for detecting the FDI attacks in this paper. Under this framework, to effectively detect bus-based FDI attacks and identify the bus node being attacked, the subnets of state identification layer in OCON adopt the ELM algorithm to accurately divide the false data and the normal data. After that, a global layer is employed to analyze whether the bus node associated with its corresponding subnet is attacked by false data utilizing the results from the state identification layer. Finally, in order to improve the resilience of the power system, a prediction recovery strategy is proposed to remedy the detected false data by exploiting the spatial correlation of power data. The proposed framework is tested on the IEEE 14 bus system using real load data from New York independent system operator. The simulation results demonstrate that the proposed framework not only accurately recognizes the multiple bus nodes under the FDI attacks but also efficiently recovers the data injected by false data.
I. INTRODUCTION
The smart grid is an energy-based cyber physical system (CPS) with the integration of information and communications technology (ICT) and cyber components, by which the energy efficiency is improved, but at the same time, the threat of cyber security is also arisen. As a cyberattack in smart grid, false data injection (FDI) attacks [1] bypass the bad data detection of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and cause the state estimation deviation, which misleads SCADA to make decisions that affect the safety of the smart grid [2] . Therefore, it is significant to study the features of FDI attacks, and further stipulate effective countermeasures for ensuring the safe and stable operation of smart grid.
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A. RELATED WORKS
Recent developments show that in FDI attacks, by judiciously forming the attack vector, the false/malicious data are injected into the smart meters/sensors, which confuses the system operator with an incorrect yet feasible system state. To defend against FDI attacks, many studies have been devoted to developing effective countermeasures [3] . In these works, the countermeasures defending against the FDI attacks are broadly divided into two categories: protection-based defense, and detection-based defense. The protection-based defense also includes two types. The first type is to physically protect the smart meters/sensors since the measurement components supported by smart meters/sensors play an important role in the smart grid and they are prone to cyberattacks. The second type is to secure the configuration of the power system. For the first type of the protection-based defense, it is crucial to determine the number and location of the measurement meters required to be protected, which can prevent the meter measurement from being compromised. From the perspective of protection of the measurement meters, Deng et al. [4] designed the least-budget defense strategy to protect power systems against FDI attacks and furthermore extended it to investigate choosing which meters for protection and to determine defense budget to be deployed on each of these meters. By utilizing the graphical methods, Bi and Zhang [5] proposed both exact and approximate algorithms to select the minimum number measurements for system protection of a set of state variables from FDI attacks. For the second type, the configuration of the power system is a necessary prior knowledge required by the attackers. Hence, it is possible to prevent FDI attacks by protecting the configuration information of the power systems. Bi and Zhang [6] investigated the defending mechanisms against FDI attacks using covert topological information. From both attackers and grid operators viewpoints, Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad [7] addressed the problem of implementing the FDI attacks when the attacker had incomplete information about the admittances of transmission lines, and also introduced a novel vulnerability measure to compare and rank different grid topologies against FDI attacks with incomplete information. Although the protection-based defense plays a certain role on defense against FDI attacks, it is not easy to guarantee that the configuration information and the protected measures are kept in absolute safety. For example, in the end of 2015, Ukraine was subjected to a large-scale power outages caused by cyberattack [8] , and experts concluded that attackers had the ability to obtain the network configuration information and the related parameters through long-term tracking and monitoring power system. Furthermore, due to the excessively high cost of protecting all smart meters/sensors in systems, the protection-based approach is more applicable to small-scale power grid, or only a set of critical smart meters/sensors and corresponding measurements.
The detection-based defense against FDI attacks is conducted on the basis of analyzing the raw measurements. In [9] , Kullback-Leibler Distance (KLD) was used to detect FDI attacks using the fact that a larger KLD was produced when false data were injected into the power systems, and the probability distributions of the measurement variations would deviate from the historical data. But with this approach, the detection accuracy was influenced by the predefined threshold. By noticing the intrinsic low dimensionality of the measurements of power grid states as well as the sparse nature of FDI attacks, Liu et al. [10] proposed a novel FDI detection mechanism based on the separation of nominal power grid states and anomalies, in which the methods of the nuclear norm minimization and low rank matrix factorization were employed to solve the problem. Huang et al. adopted an adaptive cumulative sum way to achieve fast and efficient FDI attacks detection [11] . However, for a large-scale power grid, the FDI attacks detection methods proposed in [10] and [11] may lead to the sharply increased computational complexity. Manandhar et al. [12] used Kalman filter estimator together with X 2 -detector and Euclidean detector to detect denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, random attacks, and FDI attacks. A novel distributed host-based collaborative detection method was proposed in [13] based on rule specifications, rather than state estimation, which can achieve effective FDI attacks detection in four different cases: single, sparse, random and dense, representing four distribution types of false measurement data.
B. MAIN MOTIVATION
Although methods mentioned above work on FDI attacks detection to some degree, the limitations of these traditional detection methods become more and more prominent because FDI attacks are getting more and more complicated with the developments of smart grid. In recent years, machine learning technology develops rapidly, and the detection-based defense against FDI attacks is gradually changing to this direction. Ozay et al. [14] introduced machine learning-based FDI attacks detection from four aspects: supervised learning, semi-supervised learning, decision-making and feature fusion learning, and online learning. Esmalifalak et al. [15] proposed both supervised and unsupervised learning methods to distinguish the attacked and the safe operating modes. The supervised method utilizes the supervised learning over labeled data and trains a distributed support vector machine, while the unsupervised method requires no training label and detects deviation in measurements. In [16] , by combining KLD with Power-law transformation and log transformation, a method was presented to detect FDI attacks in direct current (DC) state estimation, which not only improved the detection accuracy, but also determined the state variable of FDI attacks. He et al. [17] utilized deep learning techniques to recognize the features of false data and normal data, and realized real-time detection of FDI attacks. In the framework of big data, Wang et al. [18] applied the margin setting algorithm (MSA) to implement FDI attacks detection based on data-centric paradigm. Mohammadpourfard et al. [19] proposed a visualization-based unsupervised learning method, which identified the attacked state variables, and detected FDI attacks even after topology changes. By incorporating the artificial bee colony (ABC) and differential evolution (DE) algorithm to optimize extreme learning machine (ELM), an improved ELM for DC state estimation-based detection scheme was proposed in [20] . Khanna et al. [21] presented an artificial intelligence (AI)-based identification method to identify the compromised meters by anticipating the correct measurements in the event of the cyberattack. All in all, these machine learning-based methods not only improve the precision and accuracy of detection of the FDI attacks, but also implement location function in a real-time manner. In terms of the location of the FDI attacks, many previous studies focus on DC state estimation-based detection. However, in reality, the detection of the FDI attacks in alternating current (AC) state estimation is more practical and widely applied in the current smart grid system [9] , [28] - [30] , [34] . Hence, it is more realistic to study how to use machine learning algorithm to detect FDI attacks in AC state estimation.
The FDI detection improves the security and reliability of the smart grid system. However, smart grid, as a energy-based CPS, requires a good resilience against FDI attacks, i.e., the ability of a system to return to its normal state after being attacked [22] . Based on control theory, Pasqualetti et al. [23] provided a unified modeling framework for CPS, which allowed for a rigorous study of the detect-ability and identifiability of attacks, and for the design of monitors and attackremedy schemes as well. From game theory, the resilience of CPS was investigated in [24] in terms of the cyber and physical correlation coefficients, the reinforcement and attack levels and costs, the defenders and attackers target revenues. In [25] , a FDI attack detection method was presented, which also used the prediction measurements based on the shortterm time series to replace the attacked measurements to increase the resilience of the system. By carefully analyzing the existing studies with respect to the resilience of CPS, the works for the recovery of the data being attacked by FDI are relative less, and it is still necessary to study this topic.
C. SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS
Based on the analysis above, in this paper, we propose a FDI attacks detection method in AC state estimation through ELM-based One-Class-One-Network (OCON) framework, which not only detects the FDI attacks of the bus nodes and locates the bus nodes being attacked, but also efficiently recovers the data injected by false data. In this framework, the false data of the bus nodes are constructed in AC state estimation, and then are utilized to train the ELM in the subnet of OCON state identification layer so as to achieve high classification accuracy. Subsequently, the outputs of the state identification layers are transmitted to the global layers, and the buses under attack are determined. Finally, a prediction recovery strategy is proposed to remedy the detected false data by exploiting the spatial correlation of power data. Numerical simulation results demonstrate the proposed scheme not only effectively detects FDI attacks, but also recognizes the bus nodes under attacks and recovers the data injected by false data to a certain degree.
Next section illustrates the AC state estimation and the FDI attacks. In Section III, we describe our proposed ELM-based OCON framework for FDI attacks detection. Experimental scheme, numerical results and performance evaluation are presented in Section IV. Section V concludes this paper.
II. BACKGROUND A. AC STATE ESTIMATION
State estimation plays a very crucial role in many applications of power system [26] , such as the optimal power flow, load forecasting, contingency analysis and economic dispatch, and all are dependent on the information of state estimation [27] . Different from DC state estimation, AC state estimation uses a nonlinear function between measurements and system state [28] . The corresponding model is described as follows.
where z is the measurement vector that contains the real power P km and the reactive power Q km transmitted between any two connected buses k, m on the power system topology, and the real power injection P k and the reactive injection Q k at bus k with k, m ∈ S (S denotes the set of the system buses); x is the vector of state variables including bus voltage magnitudes and phase angles (x consists of 2 S − 1 state variables since the phase angle on the slack bus is always set to zero with S denoting the cardinality of set S, i.e.,
, and e is the vector of measurement errors, and h(x) is the nonlinear function between the measurement vector z and the system state vector x [29] , as shown in equation (2), as shown at the bottom of the next page. In (2), g km and b km are conductance and susceptance of bus k and m, θ km = θ k − θ m is the phase difference between bus k and m.
B. FDI ATTACKS IN AC STATE ESTIMATION
Traditional bad data detection technology is based on the residual analysis of r = z − h(x). Normally, the state estimation value is very close to the actual system value. It is believed that there are bad data if the residual is greater than a certain threshold τ , i.e., z − h(x) > τ . Suppose the attacker has knowledge of h(·), and letx bad and z bad = z + a denote the erroneous system state and the manipulated measurement after the FDI, respectively, the corresponding residual from the FDI attacks is
Observing from (3), in AC state estimation, the false data added to the measurement can pass bad data detection if a = h(x bad ) − h(x) [30] . In fact, when the attacker wants to inject false data into AC state estimation, the smart way is to manipulate certain system state variables. For example, supposing the attacker manipulates the real power on the bus 9 in IEEE 14 bus system, as shown in Fig. 1 , the attack vector a P 9 is calculated by (4) , as shown at the bottom of the next page. In (4), c is the false supply added on the bus 9, S 9 = {4, 7, 10, 14} is the bus set connected to bus 9. From (4), in order to launch the attack, the attacker only needs to know V 4 , V 7 , V 10 , V 14 and θ 1 , θ 7 , θ 10 , θ 14 . In other words, for the bus node-based attacks, the attacker does not require the knowledge of all state variables, but only the state variables of the specifically related buses are needed.
III. EXTREME LEARNING MACHINE-BASED OCON FRAMEWORK FOR FDI ATTACKS DETECTION
On the basis of background of the AC state estimation and FDI attacks basic principle provided in the previous section, in this section, we will describe our proposed ELM-based OCON framework for detecting the FDI attacks. The typical structure of OCON is presented in Fig. 2 . The OCON architecture is based on the decomposition of the multi-pattern classification problem into a set of two-pattern classification sub-problems. This simplified architecture has been employed in many fields, such as speech recognition [31] , face recognition [32] , and handwriting recognition [33] , and has been reported to perform a good tradeoff between classification accuracy and training complexity. However, no relevant application study of OCON framework was found in the field of detection of FDI attacks in the smart grid.
The OCON consists of two layers: the state identification layer and the global layer. The state identification layer contains multiple independent subnets to perform the task of detecting FDI attacks. According to [34] , the targeted FDI attacks in the constraints only affect the target state variables in the DC state estimation, while in AC state estimation, the FDI attacks affect not only the targeted state variables, but also the unrelated state variables. Hence, one classier is hard to handle the complex case where multiple FDI attacks coexist. In this work, we take the advantage of the features of the OCON that contains multiple subnets and propose a concept that one subnet deals with one FDI attack in the AC state estimation. Meanwhile, for a power system with larger number of buses, a corresponding number of subnets can be added to complete the FDI attacks detection. The global layer is then used to perform the task of identifying the attacked buses. In conclusion, the architecture of OCON not only effectively detects the FDI attacks of multiple bus nodes in smart grid, but also has the advantages of simple structure and strong expansibility, which is suitable for largescale information processing. In what follows, we present a detailed description of each part of the ELM-based OCON framework.
A. STATE IDENTIFICATION LAYER
The primary task of the state identification layer is to distinguish between the normal data and the false data in each subnet and output the predicted label. As studies show [9] , when false data are injected into the power systems, the probability distributions of the measurement variations deviate from the historical data. Hence, the ELM is utilized to learn the feature of the normal data and the data injected with false data. Finally, new measurements can be distinguished by the trained ELM.
In the state identification layer, since all subnets have the same input data that may contain false data of multiple bus nodes, let each subnet correspond to the FDI attacks of one bus node. Therefore, the multi-classification FDI attacks detection for all bus nodes in power system is transformed into the two-classification FDI attacks detection for each bus node. For example, in IEEE 14 bus system, since it contains 14 bus nodes, and totally 14 subnets are created in the state identification layer of OCON so that each subnet is responsible for the FDI attack detection of that bus node. Based on this fact, each subnet can exploit one-against-all based ELM model to perform its corresponding task. ELM is a single hidden layer feed-forward network [35] , and its structure is illustrated in Fig. 3 . It is well known the neural network system excels at fitting complex nonlinear mapping problem from a large amount of training data. Therefore, the neural network system is very suitable for FDI attacks detection under AC state estimation. Meanwhile, compared with other neural network structure classification algorithm, such as the deep belief network, back propagation neural network, and so on, ELM has faster learning speed and higher classification accuracy. Based on these analysis, we apply one-against-all based ELM in subnet to launch the task of the FDI attacks detection in smart grid. The IEEE 14 bus system is considered in the paper, and there are 14 subnets in the state identification layer.
To make the output of ELM as close to the expected class label as possible, it is necessary to train the output weights. As shown in Fig. 2, let x i = [x i1 , x i2 , . . . , x in ] T ∈ n denote the training data vector with n representing the dimension of the training data vector, and
∈ m the training data label with m representing the number of data type, the output function of ELM is then given by
where i = 1, 2, . . . , N with N representing the sample size, w j = [w j1 , w j2 , . . . , w jn ] ∈ n is the weight vector connecting the n input nodes to the jth hidden node, b j is the bias of jth hidden node, β j = [β j1 , β j2 , . . . , β jm ] T ∈ m is the output weight vector which connects each hidden node to every output nodes, j = 1, 2, . . . , L with L representing the number of hidden nodes, and g(·) is the activation function (we use the sigmoid function as the activation function in the paper). Let H denote the output matrix of the hidden layer, we have
Based on (6), the output function of ELM is represented as
where
with 1/λ representing a positive value which makes ELM more stable and provides a generalization performance [36] to avoid over-fitting. Hence, the output function of ELM is given as follows.
B. THE GLOBAL LAYER
The main task of the global layer is to analyze the results y i s from the state identification layers, and then determine the attacked buses. Since the detection accuracy of each subnet is generally not up to 100%, there exists an error in the output of the state identification layeres. Therefore, the global layer utilizes the decision rule, named hold-strategy [37] , to resolve the problem of identifying the attacked buses. The specific rules are as follows: (1) for most subnets, the amount of the detected false data is lower than the predefined threshold θ ; (2) however, for one or more than one subnets, the amount of the detected false data is greater than the predefined threshold θ , then the buses related with the latter are considered to be attacked, i.e.,
where Y is the output of the global layer, q and p are respectively the subsets of the set of system bus S with q ∪ p = S, y p and y d are respectively the amount of false data detected by the pth subnet and dth subnet with b ∈ q and d ∈ p.
C. THE RECOVERY STRATEGY
Once the critical measurements injected by the false data are detected, the direct removal makes the system unobservable and the state estimation unavailable [25] . To address this issue and improve the resilience of the system, we propose a prediction recovery strategy based on the spatial correlation of the power data.
According to Kirchhoff's law, the state variables vary in a mutually balanced manner in a smart grid. As such, any change of a variable state on one bus would lead to corresponding state changes of the same and/or other variables on interconnected buses [13] . Meanwhile, the measure instruments are usually placed in a fixed position. Therefore, according to the stability of the power data and geographical location information, the power data exhibit the property of the spatial correlation. From [38] , when all the measurements received at a certain time are regarded as one sample spatially, the compromised state variables cause the deviation of the spatial characteristics of the overall samples from that of the real ones. To be specific, the compromised state variables change the measurements of the attacked bus nodes and its interconnected lines, while the measurements of the remaining normal bus nodes are unchanged. Therefore, the spatial correlation between the attacked bus nodes and the remaining bus nodes is changed. 
2) THE PREDICTION RECOVERY STRATEGY
By taking advantage of the spatial correlation of the power data, a prediction recovery strategy in our proposed ELM-based OCON detection framework is designed to remedy the false data. In Fig. 4 , the flow chart of the experimental scheme outlines the procedure of the recovery strategy. The more detailed procedure of the prediction recovery strategy is given as follows. First, the ELM used for prediction is trained with the normal history data to learn the normal spatial correlation. From the detection phase, the data of the attacked bus nodes are deleted based on the detection of the FDI attacks. To recover the missing data, the remaining data are used to predict the removed data with the trained ELM. Finally, the recovered data are retransmitted to the input layer to determine if the data injected with FDI attacks have been successfully recovered.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SCHEME AND RESULTS ANALYSIS
In this section, the experimental scheme, depicted in the Fig. 4 , is developed to validate the proposed ELM-based OCON framework for FDI attacks detection. IEEE 14-bus system, shown in Fig. 1 , is considered here. The process of experiments is as follows. First, the data based on New York independent system operator (NYISO) [39] , which collects the data from 11 regions in New York every 5 minutes, are preprocessed in order to adapt to IEEE 14 bus system. Since the NYISO data are real, the load is variable, and is also reasonable to be utilized to verify the efficiency of our proposed scheme. Due to the huge amount of the load data, the specific range of the load change is difficult to calculate. Then, we construct the false data for bus nodes under the AC state estimation, and mix it into the normal data. The key of the experiments is to train and test the state identification layer until the training and testing results are efficient and accurate enough, and then the results are transmitted to the global layer, where the attacked buses are recognized.
A. DATA PROCESSING
To apply NYISO data to the IEEE 14 bus system, the data need to be processed, and the steps of processing are as follows.
Step 1: Normalize the NYISO data via min-max method and use the normalized data as the real load of the corresponding IEEE 14 bus. Due to lack of reactive load data, the reactive load data of the original IEEE 14 bus system is still used.
Step 2: Sum the normalized real load data, calculate the ratio of the normalized total load to the original total load of the IEEE 14 bus system, and then multiply the generations of all the generators with the ratio.
Step 3: Perform the power flow analysis using NewtonRaphson algorithm in the MATPOWER [40] with the above data to obtain the state vectorx.
Step 4: Calculate the measurement vector z.
B. CONSTRUCTION OF FDI ATTACKS FOR EACH BUS NODE
To verify that the proposed ELM-based OCON framework can detect the FDI attacks of multiple bus nodes, it is necessary to construct the attack vectors of all bus nodes for training and testing. For the bus node to be attacked, the false supply c is set as 0.1. In practice, it is more appropriate to set the different false supply to the different node. However, in the majority of the work [9] , [16] , [21] , the same false supply is used for each node to demonstrate the performances of developed approaches. The rationale behind is that this factor does affect the system performance to a certain degree, but it is not the deciding factor. Following the same concept, we also utilize the same false supply for each node. With this false data supply, the false data are calculated with the formula a = h(x bad )−h(x). For the purpose of training, since each subnet adopts the one-against-all strategy, each subnet contains the false data of 14 bus nodes. For the purpose of testing, the false data of the randomly chosen bus node to be attacked are added to the normal data to verify the validation of the ELM-based OCON framework on FDI attacks detection.
VOLUME 7, 2019

C. TRAINING STATE IDENTIFICATION LAYER
The aim of training the state identification layer is to minimize the output error and determine the corresponding parameters of ELM. The ELM randomly initializes the input weights and bias, and the suitable output weights are set according to the minimum norm solution criterion. Meanwhile, to further avoid over-fitting, we use as much training data as possible. The NIYSO data from Jan. 2014 to Oct. 2014 are used as normal load data, and the data of 14 months from Nov. 2014 to Dec. 2015 are injected by the false data of 14 bus nodes, respectively. Because each subnet only needs to detect the FDI attacks of one single bus node, the false data of this single bus node can be made into one class, while the normal data and the false data of other 13 bus nodes into another class. That is to say, the detection process of each subnet is mutually independent. Hence, our proposed scheme can detect the cases that multiple nodes are attacked at the same time. The ratio of the data size of these two classes is 1:23, which shows the characteristics of unbalanced data. This causes the fact the ELM cannot sufficiently learn the feature of false data, and the detection accuracy of FDI attacks may be reduced. Therefore, it is necessary to oversample the false data of targeted bus node with Synthetic Minority Oversampling Technique (SMOTE) [41] in each subnet to make the two classes of data in the same size. In the training phase, the relevant parameters are set as follows.
Although there is no a clear criterion for choosing the number of hidden layer units in the research field of neural network since determining the optimal number of hidden layer units is a NP-hard problem [42] , some rule-of-thumb methods provide a starting point for determining the number of neurons in the hidden layers. Usually, the selection of the number of hidden neurons for a neural network will based on the trial and error approach [43] . In the paper, according to some rule-of-thumb methods and the experiments, the number of hidden layer unites is set as L = 80 in the ELM. The power of the additive Gaussian white noise is 40(dB). In the training, for the subnets with the lower classification accuracy, it can be improved by increasing the number of hidden layer units to map the data to high dimensions. The classification accuracy P is measured by the formula (10) .
where D is the size of training data (x i , y i ) with x i and y i representing the data sample and the class label, respectively, g(·) represents the classier, F(a, b) is the comparison function with output being 1 for a = b, otherwise 0. When the classification accuracy tends to be stable, we save the network parameters from the training phase, including w j , b j and β j .
The training results are provided in Table 1 . It can be seen that the accuracy ratios of classification for all subnets are about 99%. It indicates that the state identification layer fully learns the feature of normal data and false data, and the suitable network parameters, which are used for classification in the subnets, are determined to prepare for the test phase.
D. TESTING STATE IDENTIFICATION LAYER
The aim of testing the state identification layer is to ensure that the obtained network parameters have the generalization capability and the reasonable results will be obtained for the unseen samples. In the phase of testing, to achieve the FDI attacks detection for single and multiple bus nodes, we test the classification accuracy and misclassification rate of each subnet.
1) TESTING THE CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY OF EACH SUBNET
To guarantee the experimental scheme to be capable of FDI attacks detection of a single bus node, we need to test the classification accuracy ratio of each subnet for the targeted FDI attacks. The NIYSO data from Jan. 1, 2017 to Jan. 19, 2017 are used as normal data, while the NIYSO data from Jan. 20, 2017 to Jan. 31, 2017 are injected with the false data. The test results are provided in the second column of Table 3 using red color.
The results can be seen that, except subnet 3 and 10, the classification accuracy rates of the subnets reach more than 90%, which indicates that the ELM-based OCON framework for FDI attacks detection is relatively accurate as a whole, though it has a bit difficulty in detecting FDI attacks of bus nodes 3 and 10. Seeing this, we try to increase the false data amplitude in subnet 3 and 10 and find that the test classification accuracy rate increases accordingly. According to the design principle of the false data in the AC state estimation, the result of the false data is related to the state and related parameters of the target and the connected branch measurement variable. However, the false data supply in this scheme is set to 0.1. For the related states and parameters of bus nodes 3 and 10, this amplitude of the attack vector is relatively small, and they are very close to the normal data when the attack vector is injected, which results in a relatively low ratio of the classification accuracy for our proposed ELM-based OCON framework. Therefore, for these types of bus nodes, such as 3 and 10, the physical protection for monitoring instruments is considered to prevent attackers from stealing data fundamentally. 
2) TESTING THE MISCLASSIFICATION RATE OF EACH SUBNET
To succeed in detecting the FDI attacks of multiple bus nodes, we need to test the misclassification rate of each subnet with the false data of other 13 bus nodes. The result is presented in Table 2 , and it is observed that except that the misclassification rate of subnet 3 is on the order magnitude of 10 −1 , the remaining subnets is of 10 −2 or even 10 −3 . The results indicate that most subnets achieve accurate classification with the FDI attacks of other 13 bus nodes (i.e., in the worst case), and hence the possibility of misjudgment is reduced. In other words, even though the normal data are injected with the false data of multiple bus nodes, each subnet still can effectively detect the FDI attacks, which provides a guarantee to detect the attacks of multiple nodes below.
E. DETERMINING THE ATTACKED NODES
According to the hold-strategy, the global layer analyzes the detected labels. Because the detection scheme has low classification accuracy only for subnet 3 from the above, the threshold θ is defined as
where N max , P min and |D| represent the maximum number of the false data to be detected in all subnets, the minimum classification accuracy ratio of all subnets and the total number of the test data, respectively. In the following, the multiple bus being attacked are simulated separately, and the results are presented as a bar graph.
1) THE RESULTS OF THE SINGLE NODE BEING ATTACKED
Assuming that a single node is attacked, we detect the FDI attacks of 14 bus nodes respectively, and for brevity, the results of the buses 1, 3, 5, 7 being attacked are provided in Fig 5. In the figure, the red bar represents the number of the detected false data, and the green bar represents the number of the detected normal data. From the results, it can be clearly observed that the proposed ELM-based OCON framework accomplishes the detection task in the case of attacking a single node. Additionally, by calculation, the detection accuracy of FDI attacks of the single bus node reaches 99% except the bus node 3. For bus node 3, due to the influence of the topology of the network, the detection accuracy of it is relatively low and around 85%. The same situation is also reported in [9] and [16] .
2) THE RESULTS OF THE TWO NODES BEING ATTACKED
Suppose that two nodes are attacked at the same time, we randomly select two combinations of two nodes being attacked from fourteen bus nodes. Here the combinations of bus nodes 5 and 10, bus nodes 3 and 13, bus nodes 4 and 11, and bus nodes 7 and 12 are considered. The corresponding output of the global layer is shown in Fig. 6 . From Fig. 6(a) , the detection accuracy of bus 5 being attacked is 100% and the bus 10 being attacking is 89.68%, and the numbers of both the detected false data for buses 5 and 10 are beyond the threshold. Meanwhile, the number of the detected false data for bus 3 is still below the threshold, although the number of the detected false data for bus 3 is obviously bigger than that for other buses. Therefore, the global layer can determine that the attacked bus nodes are 5 and 10. The similar results can be found in the cases of the buses 3 and 13, buses 4 and 11, and buses 7 and 12 being attacked in Fig. 6(b) , Fig. 6(c) , and Fig. 6(d) , respectively.
3) THE RESULTS OF THE THREE NODES BEING ATTACKED
In the same way, when three nodes are attacked at the same time, the corresponding output of the global layer is shown in 7, in which the combinations of bus nodes 1,6 and 14, 2,8 and 12, 3,7 and 11, 4,9 and 13 are considered. As can be seen from Fig. 7 , for the cases of three nodes being attacked at the same time, the detection rate of the attacked nodes are still relatively high, and the misclassification of other subnets is relatively low. Hence the attack position can be accurately determined.
In conclusion, when multiple nodes are attacked, our proposed ELM-based OCON framework still can detect FDI attacks effectively and identify the attacked nodes. This is because the subnets in our proposed framework are independent of each other, and each subnet can not only accurately detect the target FDI attacks, but also avoid misjudgment for FDI attacks of other bus nodes, while the attacked node can only be determined at the global layer.
F. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON OF THE CLASSIFIERS
In this section, the performance evaluation of classifier is conducted in the ELM-based OCON framework for FDI attacks detection. According to a standard technique to evaluate the classifier's performance, the area under curve (AUC) of the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) is used to measure the detection performance of the scheme. In addition, in order to further illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed ELMbased classification method, we use the data sets in the scheme to train and test some other classification algorithms of machine learning, such as artificial neural network (ANN) and support vector machine (SVM) [44] , and their classification performances are compared with ELM-based one. The results are shown in Table 3 . For the ELM-based classification method, the AUC values of all other subnets have reached more than 0.9, even nearly 1, except that the AUC value of the subnet 3 is 0.6396. Compared to ANN-based and SVM-based classification methods, especially for Bus 3 and Bus 10 that are harder to be detected, it can be seen that the ELM-based one has higher classification accuracy ratio and requires the least training time, which means that the ELM-based OCON framework is a promising candidate of FDI attacks detection in practice.
G. TESTING OF THE RECOVERY STRATEGY
According to the perdition recovery strategy based on the spatial correlation of power data, the false data of 14 bus nodes are remedied. Then the recovered data are passed to the input layer again and the corresponding output of the global layer is shown in Fig. 8 (Similar to Fig. 5, Fig. 6 , and Fig. 7 , the results of one bus being attacked, the two buses combinations being attacked, the three buses combinations being attacked are correspondingly provided in Fig. 8) , where the green bar and the red bar denote the number of data recovered to be normal and the number of the data without being successfully recovered, respectively. Comparing with the results in Fig. 5, Fig. 6, and Fig. 7 , it can be seen that the 
TABLE 4.
The comparison of the accuracy ratio of recovering the data being attacked by FDI between our proposed strategy and the recovery method in [25] .
prediction recovery strategy based on the spatial correlation of the power data performs reasonably well in recovering the false data. For example, in Fig. 5 , for bus 1, the number of data being attacked by FDI is 3480. By our proposed prediction recovery strategy based on the spatial correlation of power data, the number of data recovered to be normal is ultimately 3467, as shown in Fig. 8(a) .
Furthermore, Table 4 provides the comparison of the accuracy ratio of recovering the data being attacked by FDI between our proposed recovery strategy and the recovery method in [25] . In the table, the results of our proposed recovery strategy and the recovery method in [25] are represented in red color and in black color, respectively. From the table, on the whole, our proposed recovery strategy has a higher accuracy ratio of recovering the data being attacked than the recovery method in [25] , which verifies the efficiency of our proposed prediction recovery strategy.
Note: In the case of a small number of nodes being attacked, our proposed recovery strategy guarantees a high accuracy. When there is too large number of nodes being attacked, a lot of data will be deleted, and the remaining data used to predict the deleted data are dramatically reduced. When that happens, considering the predictive ability of the extreme learning machine, the predictive accuracy will be seriously affected. However, in practice, to perform an attack, a large number of system parameters and network topology are required to collect. Hence, the probability of many nodes being attacked at same time is very small. Therefore, in our simulations, the cases of at most three nodes being attacked are studied.
V. CONCLUSION
FDI attacks threaten the secure operation of smart grids. In this paper, we proposed the ELM-based OCON framework to detect FDI attacks. In this framework, the false data of the bus nodes are constructed in AC state estimation, and then are utilized to train the ELM in the subnet of OCON state identification layer so as to achieve high classification accuracy. Subsequently, the outputs of the state identification layers are transmitted to the global layer, and the buses under attack are determined. Finally, a prediction recovery strategy is proposed to remedy the detected false data by exploiting the spatial correlation of power data in order to improve the resilience of the system. Based on the IEEE 14 bus system, the comprehensive simulations are conducted and results confirm the efficiency of our proposed ELM-based OCON framework.
